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Abstract. The essay proposes a notion of “icon” understood, according to the para-
digm born of the Second Council of Nicaea (787 AD), as a visible image of the invis-
ible qua invisible. In this light, the distinctive feature of the icon-image is its ability 
to manifest the paradoxical identity-difference relationship that links visible and invis-
ible, and, consequently, representable and unrepresentable, immanence and transcend-
ence, eternity and time. By offering itself as the privileged place for the presentation 
of an absence and of a “withdrawal” (the withdrawal of the invisible from the visible 
through the visible), the icon is distinguished in the first place by its apophatic and 
kenotic character. In this sense, the salient trait of the icon is its constitutive disquiet: 
it is founded on the “relational economy” of the image, which implies the need of an 
incessant articulation of the relation between visible and invisible. We can thus see in 
the icon the paradigm itself of “great art”: indeed, like the icon, great art is always pri-
marily characterised by its disquiet, that is its ability to make transcendence appear in 
immanence, the Other of the visible appear in the visible.
Keywords. Icon, visible-invisible, incarnation, apophatic character, art.
1. To understand the icon we must look at it from a theological 
point of view, otherwise we are left with a solely aesthetic, and there-
fore incomplete, understanding. The icon – the sacred image – is 
one of the manifestations of the tradition of the Church, represent-
ing the fundamental dogma of faith in God become man. The fact 
that it bears witness to the Incarnation makes it a true and proper 
“theology as image”. It is thus understandable that its content and its 
meaning form part of the study of theology, in the same way that 
the sacred texts do. In the icon the image of Christ has a paradoxical 
definition. As Saint Gregory puts it: «It is the same thing as the pro-
totype, even if it is another thing». The Son is therefore actually the 
image of the Father, while being an “other thing”. Against the notion 
of an image considered as identical to its model, which is refused by 
the iconoclasts, the Patriarch Nicephorus emphasises the radical dif-
ference between the two. And Saint John of Damascus also argues 
that there is a difference: the image is an image and not the proto-
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type itself (AA.VV. [1997]). After the attacks of 
the iconoclasts it is necessary to give a clear defi-
nition to the image. By affirming the substantial 
difference between the image and its prototype, 
it is possible to understand what is specific to the 
image. Saint Paul says of Christ: «He is the image 
of the invisible God», and Christ says of himself: 
«He who has seen me has seen the Father». In the 
Son, the Father becomes visible and so the Son is 
the image of the Father. The iconophiles respond 
to the iconoclasts, who believe that painting an 
icon of Christ means wanting to circumscribe the 
divinity of Christ, that the Word has been made 
flesh, the Word itself is circumscribed, making 
itself visible to our eyes. In the affirmation that 
«Christ is the image of the invisible God» there is 
this notion of the “image” expressing something 
essential about Christ: his intimate link with the 
Father.
The great paradox of the Christian revela-
tion is that God himself became man and that 
this Incarnation is real. It is not the veiled pres-
ence of the universal Logos in flesh, but the iden-
tity between the Word and its humanity, in an 
indissoluble union. If the Logos «did not inhabit 
a man, but became man» then taking the Incar-
nation seriously requires us to see in the human-
ity of the Word not a means but «the flesh of the 
incorruptible God». Faith consists in believing in 
Jesus Christ, the Word made flesh, one and indi-
visible: God and man. Thus flesh is not seen as a 
veil that prevents us from seeing the hidden real-
ity of the Word but, in as much as it is the «flesh 
of God», it is in a certain sense the Word. The 
work of our salvation would not mean anything if 
the Word was not made flesh: if He had not died 
He would not have been resurrected. The mys-
tery of the Incarnation consists in the fact that the 
divine hypostasis of the Word is made human, not 
a man in general, but this man, Jesus of Nazareth, 
and that the human traits of Jesus, which are in 
the icon, are also the traits of his divine person. If 
the icon circumscribes the Word of God, it is nev-
ertheless not the first to do it, because the Son of 
God circumscribes himself by becoming man: he 
“restricts” himself until he is contained in an indi-
vidual, or what’s more, until he is this individual 
in all his contingency. Here is the “scandal” of 
faith, the scandal that consists in saying that the 
divine Person of the Word can be seen in the indi-
vidual humanity of Jesus of Nazareth. The icon, in 
making these traits individual, refers to the real-
ity that it allows us to glimpse, thus becoming the 
manifestation of the archetype.
Precisely because it is founded on the divine 
Incarnation, the Church considers the icon to be 
intrinsic to the essence of Christianity, since it is 
the revelation not only of the Word of God, but 
also of his image manifested in God-Man. It is 
thanks to the incarnation of the second Person of 
the Trinity that the existence of the image in the 
New Testament derives from its prohibition in the 
Old Testament. For the Church the sacred image 
derives precisely from this absence of the image in 
the Old Testament. The precedent of the Christian 
image is not the pagan idol, but the absence of the 
concrete and direct image before the Incarnation, 
in the same way that the precedent of the Church 
is not the pagan world but Israel, the people elect-
ed by God to welcome his Revelation. Whereas 
the iconoclasts, who comply with the biblical pro-
hibition, confuse the Christian image with the 
idol, Saint John of Damascus, comparing the Old 
Testament and evangelical texts, shows that the 
Christian image is the fulfilment of the Old Testa-
ment, since it derives from the essence of Chris-
tianity. His argument can be summed up in this 
way: in the Old Testament the direct manifesta-
tion of God to his people happens solely through 
the Word; He doesn’t show himself, he remains 
invisible – when listening to his voice, Israel 
doesn’t see an image. When the Invisible, taking 
on flesh, becomes visible, then it can represent the 
similarity with He who has appeared. That is, the 
ban on representing the invisible God implicitly 
contains the necessity of representing God once 
the prophecies have been realised. And so, the 
words of the Lord – «You haven’t seen the image; 
so don’t make it» – mean «don’t make images of 
God until you have seen him». So, according to 
Saint John of Damascus, if in the Old Testament 
the direct revelation of God is manifested only 
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in the Word, in the New Testament is manifested 
both in the Word and in the image.
Since the Invisible has become visible, the 
Unrepresentable becomes representable. God no 
longer addresses men only through the Word but 
presents himself in the Person of the Word incar-
nated, and it is for this reason that the close link 
between the word and the image is a distinct fea-
ture of the New Testament. All the prefigurations 
of the Old Testament announce a future salvation, 
that salvation which, in the present, has been real-
ised, and which the Fathers summarise in a par-
ticularly pregnant formula: «God has become man 
because man becomes God» (Ouspensky [1982]). 
This redemptive work is therefore centred on 
the Person of Christ – God become Man – and, 
beside Him, the first human person entirely dei-
fied, the Virgin. It is for this reason that the first 
icons that appear in Christianity are of Christ 
and the Virgin. The fundamental link between 
the image and Christianity is the root of the tra-
dition in which the Church has, from the begin-
ning, preached Christianity to the world through 
both the word and the image. The truth has to be 
“shown”, and as an image, it is not an idea or an 
abstract formula, but is concrete and living: it is a 
person, the Person who «suffered under Pontius 
Pilate». When Pilate asks Christ, «What is truth?», 
Christ responds by simply remaining in front of 
him in silence. And to his disciples Christ says, 
«I am the way, the truth and the life». The truth 
does not answer the question of what is but of 
who is: it is a Person, and it is for this reason that 
the Church does not simply “speak” the truth but 
“shows” it.
The Church brings the image of Christ to the 
world, the image of man and world renewed by 
the Incarnation, the image of salvation. It is Chris-
tology, then, that constitutes the basis of the dog-
matic struggle between orthodox Christians and 
heretics between the 8th and 9th Century (Schön-
born [1986], see also Evdokimov [1972]). Right at 
the beginning of iconoclasm, orthodox Christians 
understood the danger it posed for the funda-
mental dogma of Christianity. If the existence of 
the icon is founded on the Incarnation of the sec-
ond Person of the sacred Trinity, this Incarnation 
itself is affirmed and verified by the image. In the 
eyes of the Church, negating the icon of Christ is 
equivalent to negating his Incarnation, to negating 
the whole Economy of Salvation. Thus, in defend-
ing sacred images, it is not only their didactic role 
or aesthetic aspect that the Church defends, but 
the very basis of the Christian faith. This explains 
the firmness with which the orthodox Christians 
defend the icon. The term “icon” is understood in 
different ways by the iconoclasts and by the ortho-
dox Christians: according to the iconoclasts, the 
icon is necessarily of the same nature as He whom 
it represents, it must be consubstantial with Him. 
Starting from this principle, they arrive at the 
inevitable conclusion that the only icon of Christ 
is the Eucharist: if Christ, say the iconoclasts, 
chose bread as an image of his Incarnation, it is 
precisely to avoid idolatry, seeing as bread has no 
human resemblance. But for the orthodox Chris-
tians, not only is bread not consubstantial or iden-
tical to its prototype, as the iconoclasts think, but, 
on the contrary, the notion that corresponds to 
the word “icon” (eikón) contains an essential dif-
ference between the image and its prototype. «The 
representation is one thing, and that which it rep-
resents is another», claims Saint John of Damascus 
(Ouspensky [1982]: chap. VIII).
What’s more, the Patriarch Nicephorus, indi-
cating, as we have seen, the difference between 
the image and its prototype, claims that those 
who don’t accept this doctrine, who don’t under-
stand it, can justly be called “idolatrous”. Ortho-
dox Christians, sustaining the distinction between 
nature and person, claim that the icon repre-
sents not a nature but the Person that unites 
two natures without confusing them. The image 
doesn’t belong to one or the other of his natures 
but to his Person. The icon is not therefore an 
image of divine nature but is the image of a divine 
incarnated Person, and this means that the icon is 
a revelation of eternity in time. For these reasons 
the icon is linked to its prototype. As the Fathers 
of the Seventh Ecumenical Council, or the Sec-
ond Council of Nicaea (787), maintain: «the hon-
our to the icon is conveyed to the prototype» (see 
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Di Giacomo 1998). In the icon there is both dif-
ference and identity: difference of natures and 
identity of Person and as a result, as the Council 
emphasises, our attitude towards the icon must 
be that of veneration and not of adoration (see 
AA.VV. [1997]).
2. The perspective used in the Russian icons 
of the 14th, 15th and part of the 16th Century is in 
strident contradiction with the rules of linear per-
spective. The icon often depicts details and plains 
that can’t be visible at the same time: for example, 
both the sidewalls of the outside of a building are 
represented in the same image. As Pavel Florenskij 
argues, whereas icons with “more correct” draw-
ings can appear cold and lifeless, the most creative 
icons are always those with “errors” of perspective: 
thus icons that transgress perspective are superior 
to those that do not. These transgressions of the 
rules of perspective are very frequent: it’s almost 
as if there is a particular system of representation 
and perception of reality, which is that represented 
in the icon. And so, we have a general definition 
of reverse or inverse perspective, and sometimes 
even deformed or false perspective (see Florenskij 
[1967]). From the procedures of reverse perspec-
tive there follows also the policentrality of the rep-
resentation, where the picture is constructed as if 
the eye was looking from various different points 
at the same time. The task of the painting is not 
to duplicate reality but to offer the deepest under-
standing of its “architecture”, of its material and 
its meaning. That which misleads us most of all 
in this “reverse perspective” is a series of particu-
larities of form that at times seem to be insoluble 
enigmas to people brought up in modern Europe-
an cultures. Because of this such forms are often 
understood to be deformations, but these “defor-
mations” are only such when seen by an eye used 
to linear perspective. In reality we are not looking 
at a deformation but a different pictorial language, 
that of the Orthodox Church. It is necessary to 
point out that in this generally accepted techni-
cal term of “reverse perspective”, the expression 
“reversed” is not precise, because there is no pure 
and simple reversing of linear perspective – no 
inverse reflection, or mirroring – and there is no 
system of reversed perspective that would corre-
spond to the system of linear perspective. To the 
rigid laws of the latter, another “law” is opposed, 
another principle of image construction. This oth-
er principle implies a whole series of procedures 
that give a contrary (reverse) representation to the 
illusion, or one that is totally different from it.
Contemporary science itself tells us that we 
don’t see close by objects as Raphael represents 
them, but we see them as Andreij Rublëv and the 
ancient Russian artists represent them. Raphael 
clearly drew in a different way to Rublëv, but he 
saw in the same way, since there is a law of nature 
that also regards visual perception. But the differ-
ence lies here: whereas Raphael submits the natu-
ral vision of the human eye to the control of his 
reason and in this way distances himself from that 
vision, the iconographs didn’t distance themselves 
from it, because the sense of that which they were 
representing didn’t allow them to overcome our 
natural perception of the foreground, to which the 
structure of the icon is limited. The representation 
of space in the icon has this particularity: although 
it is three dimensional (the icon is not a two-
dimensional art), the third dimension is limited by 
the surface of the painting and the representation 
is orientated towards the real space that is found 
in front of the image. The icon doesn’t show us 
an illusory representation of spatial depth, but its 
inverse. Whereas a picture constructed to conform 
to the laws of linear perspective represents another 
space, which has no relation to the real space in 
which it is found, in the icon we see the contrary: 
the represented space is included in the real space 
without rupture between them. The representation 
is limited to the foreground. The people depicted 
by the icon and those which find themselves in 
front of it are united in the same space, thus the 
image addresses man in the same way as the rev-
elation addresses him.
In the icon the Unrepresentable gives itself as 
Other with respect to every determination: this 
leads to that “theology of the icon” that escapes 
every rational translation, but also to its paradoxi-
cal nature which makes it the place-non-place in 
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which the Invisible is given in the visible while 
remaining Invisible. The essence of the icon con-
sists in the passing of the Invisible into the vis-
ible and the visible into the Invisible: it is a “royal 
door” through which the Invisible is manifested 
and the visible is transformed. That the Deus 
absconditus manifests Himself in Christ, that the 
Father shows Himself in the mortal body, the cru-
cifix of the Son: these are the theological founda-
tions of the icon. And seeing as the Son, through 
the Incarnation, removed the Old Testament pro-
hibition, it follows that – as has been said above – 
the icon derives precisely from the absence of the 
image in the Old Testament. It neither represents 
divine nature, nor the human nature of the Son 
but his Person, that is the paradoxical identity-
difference of these two natures. And if the painter 
of icons doesn’t imitate or represent, but lifts the 
veil (see Cacciari [1985]), allowing this world and 
the other world to communicate with each other, 
then it means that wanting to destroy the icon is 
like wanting to close these “doors” through which 
the invisible Absolute makes itself manifest to our 
eyes. Thus the iconoclasm is precisely the nega-
tion of this epiphanic dimension (see Florenskij 
[1977]). But in the paradoxical nature of the icon, 
the epiphanic and apophatic dimensions become 
one: it shows the presence of the Invisible in the 
visible, remaining Invisible, and the presence of the 
Unsayable in the word, remaining Unsayable (see 
Byčkov [1977]). And, as Florenskij makes clear, it 
also shows the opposition, the coexistence, of Gold 
and colour in the icon, according to which Gold is 
pure light, whereas colour is the evocation of Light: 
between Gold and colour a correct distance must 
be maintained. An icon that was all Gold would 
remove the icon itself, since it would negate the 
sensible manifestation of Light. The same would be 
true of an icon that was all colour, for the sensible 
(the colour) would no longer be an area of mani-
festation, that is of Incarnation, of Light-Gold. The 
“just distance” between Gold and colour is there-
fore a paradoxical identity-difference and as such 
cannot be overcome.
In the icon there are no light sources, since 
light penetrates everywhere. The Light, symbol of 
the divine, is represented in the Gold that radiates 
light, but it is at the same time opaque, inaccessi-
ble like the divinity that it expresses. In the icon 
this particularity of the background of light must 
be understood as a symbolic tradition of the prin-
ciple of apophatic theology, which is the impossi-
bility of knowing the divine essence that remains 
totally inaccessible. This unknowability and inac-
cessibility of the divinity is called “darkness”. The 
divine darkness is this “inaccessible light” where 
God dwells. The inaccessible light is the bright-
est Light of the light. It is dazzling and therefore 
impenetrable. And Gold, that unites both splen-
did brightness and opacity, symbolically expresses 
the divine Light as impenetrable darkness, which 
is essentially different from natural light that is the 
opposite of darkness. Unlike the idol-image, the 
icon presents the beyond of the visible, seeing as 
the “Kingdom of God” is not another world, but 
the other of the world (see Ouspensky [1982]: 472-
474). And so in the icon there is always the pos-
sibility of dissonance: it contains not equilibrium 
but disquiet.
3. In the Second Council of Nicaea the the-
ses of the iconoclastic Council of 754 are refuted. 
This iconoclastic thought can define itself as a 
non-economic conception of the icon, when by 
“economy” we mean the articulation of the vis-
ible and the Invisible (see Mondzain [1986]). The 
economy provides the basis of the iconophiles’ 
position regarding the organisation of the rela-
tionship between the sacred and the profane, the 
visible and the Invisible. They argue that to refuse 
the icon is to refuse the economy, that is Christ 
himself and the whole plan of the Incarnation in 
history. The doctrine of the Incarnation and the 
doctrine of the icon are one and the same thing. 
This identity subsumes the concept of “economy”, 
and it is thanks to economy that the Church itself 
is identified with the body of Christ. The differ-
ence between theology and the economy is the 
difference that exists between believing without 
seeing and believing while seeing. In the writings 
of Saint Paul the term “economy” appears in order 
to indicate God’s plan for the salvation of human-
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ity. Precisely because Christ manifested the union 
of the Word and the flesh and made Himself an 
instrument of the Father in the plan of Salvation, 
for Christology the economy is fundamental: there 
is an economy because there is the organisation 
of visibility, of which the Incarnation is the pro-
totype and from which the organisation of every 
visibility derives. The economy needs the icon 
image that respects the distinction between the 
two natures, incarnating the Word in the heart of 
its own silence. The icon tries to avoid the catego-
ries of representation and fiction – to say that it is 
meant to be a painting and not an idol or a rep-
resentation, is to say that it establishes a gaze and 
not an object: it aims at the assimilation of seeing 
with being seen.
If the argument of early iconoclasm is by 
nature strongly Christological, we must wait for 
Nicephorus and the second wave of iconoclasm 
for the doctrine of the icon to become a philo-
sophic doctrine founded on the relational econo-
my regarding every image. And if the constituents 
of the icon call for the gaze and refuse vision, it is 
because the icon cannot be categorised as a scrap, 
but incarnates withdrawal itself. Christ is not 
in the icon, but it is the icon that looks towards 
Christ who continuously withdraws. And, through 
the lines that make up the picture, the incarnation 
works in this withdrawal, such that the mimet-
ics of the picture are also this withdrawal. The 
icon, whose function it is to put the human form 
into relation with the divine Word, is the mime-
sis of the Incarnation. It is for this reason, say the 
Fathers, that refusing the image means refusing 
the Incarnation. And if it is the icon’s abstraction 
that is in question in the debate with iconoclasm, 
on closer inspection there is no need to categori-
cally oppose the oriental doctrine of the icon to 
the relations between images found in Western 
art. Indeed even the greatest works of pictorial art 
in the West depict a place in which they are not 
perceived, and have an existential relation with the 
presence of an emptiness. In this secret emptiness 
they remain indifferent to representation, mean-
ing that every great art is kenotica. The anthropo-
morphism of Christ becomes the abandonment 
of the Father and the sacrificial rupture between 
the image and the model: here kenosi means the 
desertion of the world by the divinity (see Mari-
on [1986]). The outlines of the icon, which make 
up the picture, never constitute a perimeter, a 
limit for the being that they manifest: Christ is 
not a prisoner of the icon, the iconic sign is nei-
ther prison nor tomb, as the Platonic body was 
for the soul. The duality that the icon inhabits has 
nothing to do with the duality of the soul and the 
body, since the invisibility of the Word is not of 
the same nature as that of the soul.
The absence of God in the heart of the icon is 
comprised in the double mimetic articulation of 
Christ: the icon tells of pain and resurrection. It 
is empty of the carnal and real presence of Christ, 
but is full of his absence. This absence, through 
the trace that it leaves and the lack that it incar-
nates, produces the essence of the visible: for the 
divine, to incarnate oneself is to withdraw. The 
sign produces a division of space, as the coming 
of Christ produced the division in time between 
the Ancient and the New Alliance. The figura-
tion of the Messiah in the form of a Lamb can 
be abandoned, since Christians now have a right 
to see his Face, which is a sign of the New Law. 
Christ has been resurrected, his Face and his Per-
son (prosôpon) have triumphed over the cross, 
and the transfiguration of his body continues in 
the icon. Transfiguration, metamorphosis, such 
are the words that designate both the glory of the 
resurrected body and the operation of the gaze on 
the icon. If iconoclasm demands that the body of 
Christ be only represented before the Resurrec-
tion, when it found the immaterial luminosity of 
its divine nature, for the iconophile the face in the 
icon is the outline of an essence that repeats the 
Incarnation and the Resurrection, without ever 
representing them. The law of the icon is that the 
visible is not sensible: it appears before our eyes 
as flesh to manifest a body from which it receives 
light without ever appropriating it. Iconic anthro-
pomorphism can never be understood as repre-
sentative realism, since the figure is there to mani-
fest emptiness and the absence of that horizon 
which it gives to the gaze. To open ourselves to 
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his “relative” visibility, God chose to give the Word 
form in flesh, to take on the destiny of the figure, 
and of the instrument that serves for the redemp-
tion of the figure, which is nothing other than the 
womb of the Virgin in which the Word became 
flesh. This body must already be in the image of 
that which fertilises it: the Virgin is already part of 
the economy of the natural image.
The dawn of the first icon is manifested in the 
announcement in which the Voice says to a wom-
an that she will be the abode of the infinite. If the 
economy and the Incarnation are indissociable 
from kenosi, it is because the voice expresses itself 
in an empty place that only the icon has the right 
to enter, without ever filling it. «I am a voice cry-
ing out in the desert», and this is the same voice 
as that which says «I am Who I am». Or rather 
the voice that remains after the destruction of the 
flesh, which addresses men saying, «Here I am», 
always accompanied by, preceded by, dominated 
by, voices that say «Ecce homo». If the icon is dou-
bled in the unity of a name, it is because this same 
dual unity is the essence of the model: Christ is 
indeed two in one. And if this mysterious unity 
of two natures is at the heart of the conception 
of the figure which is the presence of the absent, 
this duality has nothing to do with that which 
opposes the body to the soul or the material to the 
spiritual: it is the union of the Word with human-
ity. Thus the icon is endowed with a power that 
is both centripetal and centrifugal. Centripetal 
because through its forms it captures the sanctity 
of its model, centrifugal because through contact 
and contamination it spreads the sacredness that 
it incarnates. This is one of the main functions of 
the economy. To the gaze, Christ offers an icon 
showing a face, that is, a gaze which is itself invis-
ible. This is therefore, firstly, an exchange of gazes, 
which conforms to an amorous scheme. With my 
invisible gaze, I look at an invisible gaze that looks 
at me. In the icon, it is not so much I who see the 
spectacle, but another gaze that holds mine. But 
Christ doesn’t simply propose that I look at him 
through my gaze and I be looked at by his gaze. 
If he asks love of me, it is not love for him but 
for his Father. If He needs me to lift up my eyes 
to Him, it is because I see not only Him, but I 
see also and above all the Father. Christ comes to 
Earth to glorify the Father and not to let his own 
glory be seen. So Christ doesn’t simply offer a vis-
ible image of the Father who remains invisible but 
a (visible) face of the Invisible itself (the Father), 
a visible image of the Invisible as invisible. This 
paradox is intelligible only if we can tear the icon 
from the logic of the image, and therefore tear 
ourselves from the tyranny of the image.
Such reflections are crucial in relation to the 
contemporary situation of the image, in which 
iconoclasm seems to have been imposed. If the 
image wants to impose itself as its own original, 
the invisible must definitively lay claim to invis-
ibility: no face, and above all no face of God, 
can demand to be seen. The question is whether 
there is a possibility that the modern model of the 
image (which is televisual) exhausts the essence 
of the visible, or if, rather, a model which is radi-
cally different from the image can be opposed to 
it. Historically at least, one model of the image 
has opposed itself to iconoclasm, and, particular-
ly in the Church, has triumphed: the icon, which 
designates not a particular pictorial genre, but 
a doctrine of the visibility of the image (see Di 
Giacomo [1999]). The duality of the spectator’s 
gaze and the visible objective is substituted with a 
triad: spectators’ gaze, visible objective and proto-
type. The prototype doesn’t simply take the role of 
an original, a referent, but intervenes as a second 
gaze that looks at the first face, that of the specta-
tor. When faced with the profane image, I remain 
the unseen seer of an image that is reduced to an 
object, constituted, at least in part, but my gaze. 
In front of the icon I feel seen: the image is no 
longer a screen, since through it another invisible 
gaze looks at me. The original intervenes as a pure 
gaze meeting my gaze. Thus the icon concerns the 
crossed paths of these two gazes.
This is what the Second Council of Nicaea 
expresses when it argues that veneration is not to 
be confused with adoration: the latter regards a 
(real) nature, the former an (unreal) gaze. When 
faced with the icon one should not adore, but 
should venerate through the visible image and 
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show oneself to the invisible gaze of the prototype. 
The icon demands to be seen through its proto-
type, which means the icon is an image to be tra-
versed. It is this that the Second Council of Nicaea 
describes through the formula of Saint Basil: «The 
honour paid to the icon passes to the prototype». 
Thus the doctrine of the icon breaks radically 
with the definition of the image, seeing as the vis-
ible object is substituted with a visible exchange in 
which both gazes – one seen, the other watching 
– cross one another and reciprocally show them-
selves. Since the icon is defined by a second gaze 
that watches the first, the visible image no longer 
puts up a screen, but on the contrary lets itself be 
traversed, giving place to the crossing of the two 
gazes. In this way the visible surface must para-
doxically cancel itself out, or at least cancel every 
opacity in itself that obfuscates the crossing of the 
two gazes. Thus the icon inverts the modern logic 
of the image: it doesn’t demand that you see it, but 
offers itself to be seen through. From its interior 
the icon lets spring another gaze, a gaze which is 
there to be seen: the disfigured figure of Christ 
offers itself as a transparency because one sees 
the gaze of God. The “defeat” of the image, real-
ised with the disfiguration of Christ, frees the first 
icon and allows the appearance of the trace of the 
invisible that watches us.
Thus one can maintain that the idol and the 
icon are two ways of being entities, not two class-
es of entity: they are different kinds of signs and 
they each use their visibility in their own way (see 
Marion [1982]). And if the divine enters into play 
only through the support of visibility, then we are 
talking of two ways of apprehending the divine 
in visibility itself. The idol, by definition, is seen: 
eidôlon means that which is seen (eidon, video). 
What’s more, it consists precisely in the fact that 
it can be seen and that it can only be seen. In 
the idol the gaze ceases to surpass itself, it ceases 
therefore to transform sensible-visible things and 
doesn’t see them any more as transparent: with the 
idol the gaze rests on the spectacle without going 
beyond it. The icon is not the result of a vision but 
that which brings about vision: it is not seen but 
appears. While the idol depends on the gaze that 
is aimed at it, the icon calls for vision, letting the 
visible gradually saturate the Invisible. However, 
even if presented by the icon, the Invisible always 
remains invisible, the icon tries to make the 
Invisible as such visible, tries therefore to ensure 
that the visible continues to refer beyond itself, 
although the Invisible can never reproduce itself 
in the visible. So the gaze is never at rest in the 
icon. This disquiet of the icon means any claim to 
an absolute knowledge ends up as idolatry.
Whilst the idol is self-referential, the icon is 
the contrary, giving all the glory to the Invisible. 
Iconoclasm criticises the supposed idolatrous deri-
vation of icons, because it persists in interpreting 
them according to the logic of similarity, without 
understanding that they have broken with the imi-
tation of an original. The icon doesn’t represent, 
but presents, not in the sense of producing a new 
presence (as Western pictures do), but in the sense 
of making present all of the sanctity of the Saint. 
The icon allows and demands veneration, but 
remains outside of every idolatry. With regards 
to the person and the face of Christ, it is the sign 
and not the nature of the Invisible – a figure at a 
distance from the Invisible, precisely because the 
Invisible traverses it. Furthermore the icon, refus-
ing adoration in favour of a simple veneration, 
transmits this veneration to the invisibility of 
Absolute Sanctity. The icon isn’t the idol of Christ, 
precisely because it refers to Him and in this way 
opens to the person of the Other as such. The vis-
ible therefore doesn’t open up to another visible, 
but to the other of the visible – the invisible Saint. 
The icon is separated from the mimetic logic of 
the image by the fact that it realises itself entirely 
through its reference to a prototype that, by defi-
nition, is invisible.
The decision taken by the Second Council of 
Nicaea now finds conceptual currency in the con-
temporary debate. Initially the icon refuses every 
reduction to visibility that would transform it 
into a simple spectacle, becoming a mere object 
for a spectator. This is because before being seen 
and making itself seen the icon silently demands 
from its visitor that the visitor be seen by it and 
demands that the invisible gaze of the visi-
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tor know that it is seeing another invisible gaze 
appear in it. The icon wants interlocutors that 
can look at each other face to face, whilst the idol 
identifies itself with its own spectacle. The icon 
merits veneration only in as much as it shows an 
other of itself and becomes in this way the pure 
type of the prototype towards which it always 
refers. This image breaks with idolatry, totally 
destroying the screen of visibility and opening the 
visible itself: far from generating a new spectacle, 
as the idol does, the icon lets another gaze emerge, 
soliciting a veneration that it transmits to its pro-
totype. The icon, therefore, has only one aim, the 
crossing of gazes, and it is in this way that it saves 
the image from the category of illusion, aiming 
at an invisible and intelligible original. The dis-
tance between the idol and the icon is defined in 
this way: the idol remains, in one way or another, 
based on desirous waiting. The icon definitively 
overcomes this waiting, annulling the prevision. 
So the icon is a testimony to the Incarnation of 
the Word of God, while the idol is a “diabolical” 
invention.
4. In the 14th Century, Moscow became the 
religious centre of Russia before becoming the 
capital. At that time of incessant internal wars 
between princes and of devastation wrought by 
the Tatar invasion, it was the Church that guaran-
teed the unity of Russia. It created a spiritual unity 
around Moscow, which was a sign of its political 
unity to come. At this time Russia experienced a 
period of intense artistic activity. Although there 
were developments in architecture, literature 
and liturgical creations at this time, it was paint-
ing that provided the fundamental expression of 
the spiritual and cultural life of the Russian peo-
ple. There was no theory of art as we understand 
it – the aesthetic appreciation of a work com-
pletely corresponded to its theological apprecia-
tion, since art was a theology that was expressed 
through aesthetic categories. If it was Byzantium 
that had been largely responsible for giving the-
ology its verbal expression, Russia gave it its vis-
ible form: it was Russia that, through the artistic 
language of the Church, had the task of revealing 
the profundity of the content of the icon and its 
supreme spirituality. In orthodox Russian thought, 
the question of knowing if one could represent 
the divinity was never posed, as if it didn’t make 
any sense. However, in the 16th century icons had 
to be painted according to ancient models: the 
orthodox icon had to correspond to the traditions, 
that is to the iconographic canon established by 
the Church. These requirements – which require 
the painter to follow ancient iconographs and not 
to paint from their imagination or represent the 
divinity according to their own ideas – are often 
considered in art history as expressing a tenden-
cy to limit the creative initiative of the painter, as 
if obliging them to literally copy the models. The 
obligation to conform to antique models is very 
common and has always existed in the Church, 
for it is in accord with the fundamentals of sacred 
art. However to paint according to ancient mod-
els doesn’t mean literally reproducing them, as 
this would limit the creativity of the painter. These 
rules don’t limit artistic creation, but prevent devi-
ations from the traditions of the Fathers, and so 
the orthodox doctrine.
With the appearance of Rublëv a new and very 
important chapter began in the history of Musco-
vite iconography. Although an autonomous school 
had already begun to form before Rublëv, it only 
acquired its own individual and clearly identifi-
able characteristics after the first quarter of the 
15th Century. Whereas before there was no sty-
listic standardisation in Muscovite icons, Rublëv 
founded local traditions based on what had been 
gleaned from the works of the Byzantine masters. 
Although owing much to Theophanes the Greek, 
with whom he worked when he was a young man, 
during his adulthood he positioned himself as the 
antipode of his master, leaving behind Theopanes’ 
severe and dramatic images (on this and, more 
broadly, on the Trinity, see Lazarev [1983]). The 
ideals of Rublëv were different, more contempla-
tive and serene, and they purposefully renounced 
both the Byzantine thinning of forms and the 
local archaic traditions, which were tenaciously 
rooted and difficult to eliminate. Rublëv devel-
oped an artistic language that was so perfect that 
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his style dictated that of the whole 15th Century. 
And he was so glorified that for many years he 
was considered to be the insuperable ideal of ico-
nography. Rublëv’s greatest work, the icon of the 
Trinity, was painted in memory of Saint Sergius 
of Radonezh, his spiritual master. In it he incar-
nates the teachings of his master. It is true that the 
theme of the trinity was particularly important at 
the time due to the struggles with heresy, but, as 
with every great work of art, the Trinity has mul-
tiple meanings, and its complicated philosophical 
content cannot be explained simply in relation to 
the struggle against heretic movements. The fig-
ures of the three angels are interpreted as a sym-
bol of the divinity that is one and three, and as a 
prefiguration of the Eucharist. In Rublëv’s icon 
there is no movement, no action. The three angels 
are sat in deep silence on three low chairs. Their 
heads are slightly tilted, their gaze aimed towards 
the infinite. Each one is immersed in their own 
thoughts. The compositional centre of the icon 
is the chalice. Together with the head of the sac-
rificed calf – the Old Testament’s prefiguration of 
the lamb in the New Testament – the chalice must 
be considered as a symbol of the Eucharist. The 
hands of the angels in the centre and on the left 
bless the chalice and these two gestures supply the 
key for interpreting the complex symbology of the 
composition.
The central angel is Christ: absorbed and deep 
in thought, his head tilted to the left, he blesses 
the chalice, expressing his desire to offer himself 
in sacrifice for the atonement of human sins. This 
act is inspired in him by God the Father (the angel 
on the left), whose face expresses a deep sadness. 
The Holy Spirit (the angel on the right) is present 
as the eternally youthful and inspirational prin-
ciple, as the “consoler”. What the Church teaches 
to be the act of the supreme sacrifice of love is 
also represented (the Father offering his Son as a 
sacrifice of atonement for the world). The artist 
does not stop there, but also represents the act of 
supreme obedience, the free choice of the Son to 
suffer and give himself as a sacrifice for the world. 
In this work Rublëv transforms the traditional 
iconographic type into an extremely profound 
symbol, pushing us to reconsider this ancient 
theme in a completely new way. In Rublëv’s Trin-
ity, symbolism of a purely ecclesiastic type gives 
rise to something more touching – a symbol of 
human love and its ideal content – which is much 
more profound and incisive than a simple juxta-
position of ecclesiastical symbols. In its perfect 
artistic forms it incarnates the ideal of peace and 
social concord to which the best Russian souls 
were aspiring at the time, and which they sought 
in vain in their contemporary reality. As in every 
great work of art, in the Trinity everything is sub-
ordinated to a fundamental idea: the composi-
tion – the linear rhythm and the colour. There is 
something pacifying in this icon, that encourages 
absorbed contemplation. The angels of the Trinity 
are the most poetic image of all ancient Russian 
art: their bodies are slender, light, as if weightless. 
The figures of the angels, which slightly widen in 
the middle and narrow towards the top and bot-
tom, are constructed according to the rhomboidal 
scheme dear to Rublëv, giving them a surprising 
lightness. There is no trace of severe asceticism in 
these angels: the corporal principle is not sacri-
ficed to the spiritual, but is fused with it.
In the icon of the Trinity the motif of the cir-
cle continually recurs as the dominant motif of 
the whole composition: it is visible in the angel 
leaning forward on the right, in the slope of the 
mountain, in the tree, in the head of the central 
angel, and the curved line of the angel on the left, 
and in the pedestals next to one another. The art-
ist isn’t afraid to disturb this circular rhythm with 
the vertical positioning of the house, knowing that 
it makes his composition even more graceful and 
free, and he is also not worried by the tilted head 
of the central angel, that breaks the symmetry 
of the upper part of the icon, since it effectively 
restabilises the equilibrium, moving the pedestal 
a bit to the right. The chalice of the Eucharist is 
also moved towards the right, thus also becoming 
a counterweight to the head of the central angel 
inclined towards the left. Thanks to the exten-
sive use of these asymmetrical arrangements, the 
composition acquires a rare elasticity, conserving 
its centripetal character and the equilibrium of 
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masses. By putting the circle, a geometrical figure, 
at the base of his composition, Rublëv subordi-
nates the composition to the surface of the pic-
ture. Although the angels at the sides sit in front 
of the table and the central angel behind it, all 
three of the figures seem to be arranged within 
the limits of a single spatial zone that has mini-
mal depth and strictly corresponds to the height 
and width of the picture. The total harmony that 
makes Rublëv’s icon such a work of perfection 
arises from this proportionality between the three 
dimensions: if the figures were larger or the space 
was deeper, the harmony would immediately be 
broken. It is precisely through interpreting his 
figures as pure outline and making the lines and 
spots of colour his principal means of artistic 
expression that Rublëv is able to conserve that 
surface rhythm that has always fascinated the Rus-
sian iconographs, and which gives the composi-
tion its extraordinary lightness.
What is most noteworthy in Rublëv’s icon is 
its chromatism. It firstly affects us with its marvel-
lous colours, their unrivalled harmony. In Rublëv 
there is almost no shade, and so his palette is 
distinguished not only for its extreme bright-
ness but also for its rare transparency. The figure 
of the central angel is brought into relief through 
the intensity of the blue. Although leaning on the 
table, it has no heaviness: it seems weightless like 
the figures of the angels at the sides. But as much 
as the quiet between the three in their wordless 
meeting appears superhuman, we also perceive the 
tumult below – the earthly lacerations and suffer-
ings from which the work is born. It is a eulogy 
that is born from a foundation of anguish – some-
thing that the director Andrej Tarkovskij shows 
clearly in his film dedicated to Andreij Rublëv. All 
of the figures reflect that identity-difference that is 
the paradoxical nature of the icon: they are simi-
lar while being distinct. In this icon there is also 
a harmony between Chronos e Aiòn (between time 
and eternity) that, as we have seen, is essential for 
understanding the theological foundations of the 
art of the icon (see Cacciari [2007]). In the icon 
it isn’t the dimension of logos that dominates, but 
that of pathos – meaning that participation domi-
nates over mere contemplation – both the contin-
uous line of time and the Euclidean spatial com-
position are overcome. The spatial composition of 
the Trinity is as follows: the first angel, on the left 
of the viewer, is the Father; in the middle of the 
symbol of the Trinity sits the Son; on our right the 
Holy Spirit. That the Son, therefore, sits on the left 
of the Father, shows an “inversion” with respect to 
the liturgical conventions, an inversion the makes 
visible how spatial coordinates have no value and 
how the icon is called upon to continually unveil 
their mere conventionality. The scene is free of all 
abstract symmetry as if to demonstrate the extra-
neousness of the icon to every aesthetic canon, 
and in the same way it is free from every illusion 
of perspective. In Rublëv’s Trinity everything is 
symbol, but nothing is abstracted from the most 
intense aesthetic emotion. Everything is idea, but 
in the sense of the ideîn, of the fullness of seeing.
The question posed by the icon, its presenta-
tion of the relationship between visible and invis-
ible as a paradoxical relationship which, as such, 
is always in movement, and never representable 
statically once and for all, throws light on con-
temporary artistic productions. It is no surprise 
that, both from the artistic and spiritual points of 
view, the icon is one of the greatest discoveries of 
the 20th century. This is shown by painters such as 
Henri Matisse and Kazimir Malevich. This discov-
ery occurred at the eve of great historical turmoil, 
and it is in this period that the icon appears as a 
supreme treasure of human art. Indeed, if spir-
itual decadence is manifested in the oblivion of 
the icon, the spiritual reawakening provoked by 
catastrophes and turmoil returns us to the icon, 
pushing us to understand its language and mean-
ing and to become conscious of it. The icon is no 
longer revealed as a past, but born again as our 
present, characterised by a slow penetration of 
the spiritual sense of the icon. The fact is that the 
orthodox icon is the only art in the world that, at 
the artistic level, reveals the meaning of life – a 
meaning that is much needed in contemporary 
European culture. Lost is the paradoxical nature 
of the icon, that is the insurmountable antinomic-
ity of visible and invisible; in contemporary art we 
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either find only the visible dimension or only the 
invisible dimension, leading towards iconoclasm. 
Contemporary figuration oscillates between the 
triumph of a simply sensible-visible conception 
and the desire to return to the Old Testament pro-
hibition. It is as if the terms of the icon’s domi-
nant polarity were confused into being only one 
dimension while simultaneously totally separating 
themselves. Putting the two poles of the icon into 
a paradoxical tension, this art puts the antinomi-
cal structure to the test, as if from the inside.
However, where there is “great art” we always 
find iconic antinomicity. As in the icon, in “great 
art”, the Invisible, from the immobile Absolute, 
is that same force that liberates us from imme-
diate sensible being: from absolute immanence 
emerges transcendence. This manifests the Truth 
of the icon, which is at one with his Incarnation 
and his cross and that, as such, manifests itself as 
a Truth that is not static (given once and for all), 
but always in movement, unquiet. This is the truth 
as alétheia, a truth that re-veals, that unveils in its 
veiling. This is an antinomical Truth: coincidentia 
oppositorum. In this way the icon is the presenta-
tion of the Truth in as much as it contains in itself 
its own negation. It bears witness to this insuper-
able coincidentia of visible and invisible through 
its docta ignorantia (see Cacciari [1985]: 173-211). 
There is no final truth-reality, therefore, as there is 
no initial truth-reality. And not only does Euclid-
ean space not have sense in the icon, but nei-
ther does “Pauline” time. There is a fundamental 
anachronism in the icon: the principle is the end 
and the end is the principle. It is the refusal of 
mechanistic, unidirectional time, as the “eternal 
return” of Nietzsche teaches us. Every moment, 
every given is already full of a multiplicity of 
meanings and of numerous possibilities, and that 
excludes us from waiting for a definitive Sense.
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